Environmental Law in Madagascar: The Nagoya Protocol on Genetic Resource Use, Access and Benefit Sharing by Sanbar, Sarah
SIT Graduate Institute/SIT Study Abroad
SIT Digital Collections
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection SIT Study Abroad
Fall 2015
Environmental Law in Madagascar: The Nagoya
Protocol on Genetic Resource Use, Access and
Benefit Sharing
Sarah Sanbar
SIT Graduate Institute - Study Abroad
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection
Part of the African Studies Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons
This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the SIT Study Abroad at SIT Digital Collections. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection by an authorized administrator of SIT Digital Collections. For more information, please
contact digitalcollections@sit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sanbar, Sarah, "Environmental Law in Madagascar: The Nagoya Protocol on Genetic Resource Use, Access and Benefit Sharing"





Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................................... 3 
 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................. 3 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 4 
 
METHODS ................................................................................................................................................... 6 
 
GENETIC RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS IN MADAGASCAR ............................................................. 7 
 
LEGALLY BINDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THEIR DOMESTIC 
IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................................................................... 13 
CONVENTION ON BIODIVERSITY (CBD) AND THE BONN GUIDELINES ............................................. 13 
NAGOYA PROTOCOL .......................................................................................................................................... 16 
Madagascar’s Obligations as Party to the Protocol .............................................................................. 17 
Trans-sectorial and International Legal Implications of the Nagoya Protocol .......................... 21 
Implementation: Process and Challenges ................................................................................................... 24 
 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS ............................................................ 27 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE BIODIVERSITY GROUPS - MADAGASCAR ...................................... 27 
Access and Use ....................................................................................................................................................... 30 
Benefit Sharing ....................................................................................................................................................... 33 
 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................... 36 
 
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................................ 37 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 39 
 





I would like to express my utmost gratitude to the SIT team in both Zanzibar 
and Madagascar, especially Nat Quansah for his support in my research, Said, and 
my host family. I would like to thank my Advisor, Voahangy Raharimalala, for her 
generosity with her time and knowledge, and Claremont McKenna College for giving 
me this opportunity. I especially want to thank my parents, Shadi and Jennifer, and 
the rest of my family for their never-ending support and love for me. 
ABSTRACT 
The rapid expansion of the biosciences has led many to turn to nature in 
search of genetic resources of commercial value. Bioprospecting, or the search for 
plants and animals from which commercially valuable compounds can be obtained, 
is often a transnational activity. Four-fifths of the world’s biodiversity is found in 
developing countries, and those searching to exploit the biodiversity of these 
nations overwhelmingly tend to come from developed, wealthy countries. This 
asymmetry, when coupled with the lack of institutional legislative frameworks and 
regulation, creates a plethora of user/host conflicts. This paper seeks to examine the 
current state of affairs regarding environmental law in Madagascar as it relates to 
management of bioprospecting and genetic resource use conflicts. Firstly, it will 
examine international and domestic environmental law – with an emphasis on the 
recently ratified Convention on Biodiversity and the Nagoya Protocol. Secondly, 
non-governmental contractual agreements between local and foreign entities will be 
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examined, with an emphasis on the International Cooperative Biodiversity Group as 
a case study. The study will conclude with suggestions, warnings, and potential 
future research opportunities.  
INTRODUCTION 
Madagascar is a highly diverse island nation located off the coast of Africa in 
the Indian Ocean. Madagascar broke off from the mainland Africa 165 million years 
ago, and from India 70 million years ago. Since then, it has followed a relatively 
isolated evolutionary path resulting in one of the most unique ecosystems on earth. 
Madagascar is host to 12,000 species of vascular plants (96% endemic). Over 90% 
of all its wildlife is found nowhere else on earth, and 5% of all of earth’s biodiversity 
is found on Madagascar (Madagascar – Country Profile). 
 Harnessing Madagascar’s biodiversity has been an invaluable tool in 
ensuring the prosperity and livelihood of its people. Madagascar’s rich ecosystems 
provide food, medicine, construction tools, and energy. An estimated 18 million 
people depend on biodiversity in Madagascar for their subsistence needs, and at 
least 70% of the population depends on agriculture (Madagascar – Country Profile). 
  Just as Madagascar’s biodiversity has sustained life for its people, it has also 
attracted considerable foreign interest, particularly from those wishing to utilise 
and exploit Madagascar’s biodiversity – namely, bioprospectors.   
Bioprospecting has played a critical role in how humans interact and use the 
nature that surrounds us for centuries. It is how we discover what is edible, what is 
medicinal, what can be grown and what should be avoided. Yet the rapid recent 
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growth of the biosciences and the commercialisation of nature has morphed 
bioprospecting into its current form. Elsa Tsioumani defines it as, “the search for 
plants and animals from which commercially valuable compounds can be obtained. 
(Tsioumani, 2015)” It occurs across several sectors such as agriculture, cosmetics, 
energy, and medicine, and in ecosystems ranging from forests to marine. When done 
carefully and properly, bioprospecting has the potential to produce results 
beneficial to humankind. 
In the food and agriculture sector, plants and food sources shown to be 
drought resistant, flood resistant, and pest resistant have contributed considerably 
to the genetically modified food industry. In turn, these discoveries have paved the 
way for increased food security – and sovereignty – in countries that are the most 
affected by climate change, poverty, and hunger (Duraisamy, 2011).   
The cosmetics industry constantly has to respond to the vast market demand 
on beauty and personal hygiene products. Consumers – and thus suppliers – are 
constantly searching for anti-aging, anti-acne, anti-dandruff, and skin whitening 
formulas, in addition to the basic colouring products of lipstick and eye shadow. 
Bioprospecting enables them to keep up with that demand through discovery of 
useful compounds found in nature. For example, many skin-whitening products find 
their active molecules in liquorice extracts, mulberry, and aloe (Duraisamy, 2011). 
It is the pharmaceutical industry that invests the greatest amount of 
resources in bioprospecting. Plants are humans’ original source of healthcare, and 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that even with the development of 
occidental medicine, “approximately 80% of the global population rely 
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predominantly on traditional [plant-based] medicines as their primary source of 
health care.” This is true in Madagascar, and approximately one million tonnes of 
medicinal plants are exported each year at a value of $3.59 million (Madagascar – 
Country Profile). 
Outcomes of bioprospecting have the potential to save lives, cure diseases, 
and pave the way for new scientific discoveries and insights. Yet in the absence of a 
national regulatory framework, bioprospecting in Madagascar has resulted in 
conflicts over resources. Implementation of this framework is of paramount 
importance for the continued development of Madagascar. This paper will discuss 
various case studies of conflicts that have arisen as a result of bioprospecting in 
Madagascar, followed by the international, domestic, and non-governmental 
attempts to control and manage the sustainable use and mutual benefit of 
Madagascar’s genetic resources. 
METHODS 
This study was conducted from the 5th to the 28th of November 2015. 
Informational sources include a collection of both primary and secondary sources. 
Primary information was gathered through a series of interviews conducted at the 
offices of those being interviewed. Interviews took place primarily in English, 
though some were conducted in French or Malagasy with the assistance of a 
translator. Prior informed consent was granted for utilisation of information 
obtained during the interview. 
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 Secondary sources come from a range of available academic literature 
regarding environmental law, bioprospecting in Madagascar, and various 
international treaties and conventions.  
 No raw data was collected from field surveys or otherwise.  
GENETIC RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS IN MADAGASCAR 
With nature providing the obvious source of potential compounds, the next 
question then becomes how to go about searching for these compounds. With hosts 
ranging from plants and marine organisms to microbes and fungi, scientists must 
figure out a way to effectively and efficiently narrow down the hundreds of 
thousands of potential species to be evaluated. 
The five primary selection and screening techniques are random, 
taxonomically guided, eco-rational, ethnobotanical, and zoopharmacognosy (Table 
1). Random collection is most often used to gather large amounts of data and 
establish population baselines, surveys, and botanical diversity counts. They are 
rarely effective as a primary means of compound discovery, as they tend to be far 
too broad (Miller, J.S., 2005). 
Taxonomically guided screening uses families or genera of presumed 
chemical interest to direct research. Eco-rational and zoopharmacognosy methods 
involve observing animal or ecological species interactions for behaviour or 
characteristics. An example of this comes from observation of the sea sponge. 
Cancer research institutes have long been searching for compounds that break 
down or stop cell growth. Rapid, uncontrollable cell replication causes the growth of 
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tumours, and scientists have long been searching for a compound that, when 
targeted, can stop or slow the replication of cells and break down existing ones. It 
was through an observation of the defence mechanisms of the sea sponge that its 
potential was revealed (Richmond, Lecture 15/10/2015). 
The sea sponge is an immobile marine invertebrate usually found in coral 
reefs with high sunlight. Due to its immobility, the sea sponge has had to develop 
defence mechanisms that protect it against coral that often grows over the sponge, 
thus blocking its access to light and starving it. To protect against this, when the sea 
sponge senses coral intruding on its territory, it releases chemicals that break down 
the corals calcium carbonate skeleton, and prevent it from continued growth 
(Richmond Lecture, 15/10/2014).  
It was through observation of this defence mechanism that scientists began 
to investigate further the anti-cancer potentials of sea sponges. A Caribbean sponge 
has been discovered to generate compounds used in AZT (zidovudine, Retrovir), 
which is used to fight the AIDS virus (Sandhu, H.S., 2006). 
While these techniques of bioprospecting provide the fewest social conflicts 
with local populations, they can often lead to overexploitation of endemic flora, 
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fauna, and fungi. This happened in Madagascar, Cameroon, and several other African 
nations with the case of the African Cherry, or Prunus africana. The P. africana is a 
secondary forest canopy tree species whose overexploitation has resulted in severe 
Afromontane deforestation. Extracts from the bark began to be used to treat 
prostatic hyperplasia, and the trade was worth approximately $220 million in the 
1990s. The high demand for the bark on European markets led to the annual 
collection of 3300 tonnes of bark annually (Bodeker, G., 2014). 
 Improper collection techniques and a high demand ultimately resulted in the 
once common species being included in Appendix II of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) of Wild Flora and Fauna at the 
Ninth CITES Conference of the Parties in 1995. As Bodeker notes, “Overexploitation 
of P. africana has occurred in the absence of legally binding treaties, the historic 
neglect of customary ownership issues, the disregard for the rights of traditional 
knowledge holders, and the complicity of governments in allowing unsustainable 
trade, attributed by some commentators to endemic corruption within the 
concerned governments.” (Bodeker, G., 2014). 
Finally, ethnobotanical bioprospecting involves using local or traditional 
knowledge about plant uses to guide surveys and testing. Yet it is another grey area 
that has led to several conflicts between users and providers of genetic resources 
(Miller, J.S., 2005). 
There are currently 2,300 plants used for medicinal purposes in Madagascar, 
and traditional healers, as the possessors of that knowledge, have never constituted 
a threat to the conservation of biodiversity (Madagascar – Country Profile). Despite 
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pre and post colonial-era stigmatisations and the legal oppression of traditional 
healers, including its official prohibition until 2007, Malagasy healers have often 
been very open about sharing their knowledge of plants (Ratsimbason, Interview 
11/11/15).  
Yet the improper use of traditional knowledge (TK) has resulted in cases of 
biopiracy, in which TK is exploited for commercial gain with no compensation to the 
indigenous people themselves (Shiva, 1997). Perhaps one of the most famous and 
oldest cases of biopiracy is that of the Catharantus roseus, or the rosy periwinkle, 
which dates to the 1960s. The plant, while native to Madagascar, has been widely 
introduced to other tropical countries around the world. Researchers obtained TK 
from communities in Jamaica regarding its efficacy as a cure for diabetes. Yet the 
introduction into other countries created a transnational situation in which 
different countries are reported as having different beliefs about the uses of the 
plant (Quansah, N., pers. comm. 3/12/2015). The transnational nature of the plant 
meant that researchers could obtain knowledge in one country, and cultivate the 
plant in another one. This further complicates claims of who, or which community, 
deserves compensation and for what (Shiva, 1997). 
Research by the Western pharmaceutical company, Eli Lilly, revealed 
alternate uses from the traditional ones. Importantly, the Hodgkin’s Lymphoma 
chemotherapy drugs vinblastine and vincristine (for childhood leukaemia) were 
derived from the rosy periwinkle. Development of these drugs has resulted in $100 
million net profit annually for Eli Lilly, though no benefits (monetary or otherwise) 
have been given to source communities. This conflict of benefit sharing is at the 
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heart of modern legal discourse surrounding the use of genetic resources . 
(Quansah, N., pers. comm. 3/12/2015).   
The Malagasy government has also come in conflict with the non-profit 
sector. The NGO l’Homme et l’Environnement recently partnered with the UNEP 
World Conservation Monitoring Centre and Chanel Parfums Beauté. They developed 
the book “Inventaire des Plantes Médicinales de Vohimana Madagascar,” which 
outlines the plants of Vohimana and their traditional medicinal uses. The Office 
National pour l’Environnement (ONE) was unhappy with this publication for two 
reasons. Firstly, the process was carried out without the consent of the Malagasy 
government. Secondly, the publication of this traditional knowledge places it in the 
public domain with l’Homme et l’Environnement as the technical owners of this 
information, making it much more difficult to protect (Raharimalala, V., Interview, 
26/11/2015).  
The improper use of traditional knowledge raises further the issue of prior 
informed consent (PIC). PIC is defined as “assent to permit an occurrence that is 
based on a complete disclosure of facts needed to make the decision intelligently, such 
as knowledge of the risks entailed or alternatives” (West’s Encyclopaedia of American 
Law, 2008). PIC does not only apply to the use of TK, but also grants organisations 
wishing to bioprospect access to the communities’ resources.  
In the absence of a national regulatory framework outlining the 
requirements for PIC, the onus lies on companies to obtain PIC. Yet what this often 
means is that with nothing to check companies, PIC is either not obtained, obtained 
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through dishonest or obscure means, or it is obtained, but not from a figure with the 
authority to give consent (Shiva, 1997).   
Finally, international patenting laws were created primarily by and for 
industrialised countries. General rules are that a product to be patented must be 
new, novel, and it cannot be in its naturally occurring form. In the pharmaceutical 
sector, this generally means that you can use a plant for medicine and patent it, but 
only the isolated active molecule responsible for the medicinal purposes is patented 
(no longer in its naturally occurring form) (World Trade Organisation, 2006).  
The process of isolating an active molecule is a lengthy, difficult, and costly 
process that involves equipment most research organisations in Madagascar do not 
have access to. So, instead, Malagasy pharmaceutical companies and research 
centres like IMRA, CNARP, and SOTRAMEX often settle for isolating the compound 
as an essential oil, putting it in pill form, and patenting the whole pill. The active 
molecule is in the pill – they just do not have a precise chemical formula for it.  
What this means is that under international patent law, the Malagasy 
company has a patent on the pill as a whole. So, if a foreign company were to take 
that exact pill and manage to isolate the active molecule within it (or take it out of its 
naturally occurring form by isolating or synthesising it) and then develop a drug 
that makes millions, it is a perfectly legal loophole that cheats and excludes 
Madagascar out of their profits (Ratsimbason Interview, 11/11/2015).  
With so many conflicts arising out of the use of genetic resources, legislation 
must be comprehensive and broad to ensure adequate access, use, and benefit 
sharing for both user and provider countries.  
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LEGALLY BINDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND 
THEIR DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and the Bonn Guidelines 
 
Discussions regarding genetic resources have been on the international 
agenda since the 1990s. In 1992 the United Nations Conference on the Environment 
and Development led to a record 157 signatories to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) and its ratification in December 1993. The CBD paved the way for 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), and the legal backbone of 
international environmental governance (McGraw, D., 2002).  
 Article 1 of the CBD outlines its three main goals; conservation of 
biodiversity, sustainable use of resources, and equitable sharing of benefits derived 
from the use of genetic resources. It is the final goal that makes the CBD so 
revolutionary, and reflects the bargaining power held by developing countries as the 
collective owners of four-fifths of the world’s biodiversity (McGraw, D., 2002). These 
biologically rich countries, like Madagascar, felt they were not receiving adequate 
compensation from high yielding pharmaceuticals and cosmetics whose core 
elements come from their territories. They argued that this asymmetrical economic 
benefit system reduced the incentive to conserve. Thus, the ability to include the 
equitable sharing of benefits as an objective of the CBD was an important step in 
recalibrating the incentives for biodiversity conservation. 
 Articles 15, 16, 19, and 18(j) cover access and benefit sharing (ABS) 
provisions in the CBD. Article 15 of the CBD addresses the terms and conditions for 
access to genetic resources by outlining the basic principles it should uphold. 
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Importantly, it recognises the sovereignty of States over their natural resources. 
This places the government as custodian, and in the position to grant or deny access 
subject to the prior informed consent (PIC) of the contracting party providing such 
resources. Terms of access shall be “based on mutually agreed upon terms (MAT) in 
order to ensure the sharing of benefits arising from the commercial or other 
utilization of these genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such 
resources (CBD, 2001)”    
 Furthermore, the CBD includes compliance and enforcement provisions.  
Article 18.3 was responsible for the establishment of a Clearing House Mechanism 
(CHM), which was implemented after Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
(COP) 10 Decision X/15. The Clearing Houses’ main goals include promoting 
information sharing to facilitate the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol and 
National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans, a network of CHMs, and the 
establishment of a national focal point for the CHM (CBD Website).  
 Madagascar was signatory to this convention on 8 June 1992, and ratified the 
convention on 4 March 1996, under the Presidency of Albert Zafy. Like many other 
countries, this treaty provided Madagascar with the legal backing to demand 
compensation for, and regulate the use of, its genetic resources. Many in the country 
greeted the CBD with open arms (Ramiandrarivo, L., Interview, 17/11/2015). 
 Although the CBD entered into force at the end of 1993, and despite it being a 
legally binding document, few countries had developed domestic legislation in an 
attempt to comply with CBD principles, and even fewer were enforcing that 
legislation. Furthermore, those countries who did have the legal capacity to 
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translate CBD provisions into ABS law tended to be industrialised countries with 
advanced biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries – those with both a 
heightened interest in access to resources and little desire to engage in benefit 
sharing. It seemed that the victory developing countries had achieved in ensuring 
Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) provisions in the CBD was purely nominal 
(Morgera, E., 2012). 
Madagascar, continuing down its own path as a fledgling democracy with a 
weak central government, was not in a position to draft, approve, or enforce ABS 
legislation. Madagascar continued to face issues regarding access and use of genetic 
resources, as previously indicated with the cases of the Prunus Africana and the 
Rosy Periwinkle. 
 It was not until 1999 that attempts to operationalize the ABS provisions of 
the CBD began. Work began on drafting the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising Out of Their 
Utilisation.  
 The first draft of the Bonn Guidelines was presented in October 2001, and 
eventually adopted with some changes during COP 6, in April 2002. Though the 
guidelines are not legally binding, their unanimous adoption by some 180 countries 
gives them clear and indisputable authority. As stated in the introduction to the 
Bonn Guidelines, written by Executive Secretary Hamdallah Zedan: 
The Guidelines identify the steps in the access and benefit-
sharing process, with an emphasis on the obligation for users to 
seek the prior informed consent of providers. They also identify 
the basic requirements for mutually agreed terms and define 
the main roles and responsibilities of users and providers and 
stress the importance of the involvement of all stakeholders. 
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They also cover other elements such as incentives, 
accountability, means for verification and dispute settlement. 
Finally, they enumerate suggested elements for inclusion in 
material transfer agreements and provide an indicative list of 
both monetary and non-monetary benefits. 
 
 The suggested elements for inclusion in material transfer agreements and list 
of monetary and non-monetary benefits have been included as Appendices A and B 
respectively.  
 The Bonn Guidelines operated under the assumption that all countries are 
both users and providers of genetic resources. As such, countries were expected to 
adopt “both source-country measures, including provisions clarifying each country’s 
sovereign rights over genetic resources, and the identification of access procedures 
and requirements; and user-country measures, by which each country addresses the 
responsibility of users under its jurisdiction who are utilising genetic resources 
from other countries. (Morgera, E., 2012)” 
 Similar to the CBD, little progress was made by Parties to actualise ABS 
legislation following the adoption of the Bonn Guidelines. It was, after all, a non-
binding document. Nevertheless, four months later, in August 2002, the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development triggered the negotiations that led to the 
development of the Nagoya Protocol.  
Nagoya Protocol 
 
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising Out of Their Utilisation to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity is the culmination of almost two decades of discussion and 
negotiation regarding ABS. It entered into force on 12 October 2014 after being 
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ratified by 54 countries – including Madagascar. It provides a much more thorough, 
and legally binding alternative to the Bonn Guidelines. Madagascar is currently in 
the process of implementation.     
It is hoped that the Nagoya Protocol will leverage the interests of all 
stakeholders in a way that results in mutually beneficial arrangements. Benefit 
sharing agreements will incentivise provider countries to make their genetic 
resources accessible. On the other hand, enhancing researchers’ access based on 
reliable decisions at low transaction costs will encourage scientific breakthroughs 
and the innovation of useful goods and services whilst promoting country 
development (Morgera, E., 2012). 
This section assesses what Madagascar’s obligations as Party to the Protocol 
are, the trans-sectorial legal implications of the Nagoya Protocol, and the 
implementation process and challenges Madagascar faces going forward. 
Madagascar’s Obligations as Party to the Protocol 
 
Though many criticised the document as inadequate (COP 10, pg. 98 – 102) – 
including Madagascar and the African Group – major steps were taken in setting 
precedents for access, institutional obligations, and benefit-sharing mechanisms. 
 First, the Nagoya protocol outlined and defined several key terms and 
concepts that had otherwise been left amorphous. Article 2.c states “utilisation of 
genetic resources” to mean, “to conduct research and development on the genetic 
and/or biochemical composition of genetic resources, including through the 
application of biotechnology.” It defines in Article 2.d biotechnology as “any 
technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivates 
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thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.” Finally, it defines 
“derivates” in Article 2.e as “a naturally occurring biochemical compound resulting 
from the genetic expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources, even if 
it does not contain functional units of heredity.” 
Definition of these terms is of paramount importance, as it sets the precedent 
and scope for what may or may not be under the jurisdiction of the Protocol. 
 Secondly, in Articles 6, 7, and 12, issues regarding access to genetic resources 
and the traditional or indigenous knowledge associated with said resources are 
addressed. Madagascar is responsible under Article 6 to take steps to establish:  
1. Legal certainty, clarity, transparency, and timeliness; 
2. Fair and non-arbitrary access rules and procedures; 
3. Information on how to apply for PIC; 
4. Clear and transparent written decision by a competent national 
authority, in a cost effective manner and within a reasonable period of 
time; and 
5. Issuance of a permit or its equivalent at the time of access as evidence of 
PIC and the establishment of mutually agreed upon terms (MAT).  
 
Similar to the Bonn Guidelines, the Protocol operates off the assumption that 
all countries are both user and provider countries. As such, administrative 
procedures for obtaining prior informed consent and establishing rules of access are 
the same for both foreign and domestic entities seeking access rights. 
 Madagascar’s government must provide the necessary institutional 
arrangements to ensure the accessibility of its genetic resources, and to develop 
domestic regulations regarding the parameters of benefit sharing, as stated in 
Article 15 (Compliance with Domestic Legislation or Regulatory Requirements on 
Access and Benefit Sharing), and Article 16 (Compliance with Domestic Legislation 
or Regulatory Requirements on Access and Benefit Sharing for Traditional 
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Knowledge Associated with Genetic Resources). Furthermore, precise terms and 
arrangements for the process and activation of ABS are to be arranged among 
relevant parties in the development of MAT.  
 Benefits shared may be monetary (in the form of access fees, milestone 
payments, royalty payments, or research funding), or non-monetary (in the form of 
information sharing, product development participation, technology transfers, or 
institutional capacity building projects). Benefits are encouraged to promote the 
first two goals of the CBD, conservation and sustainable use. See Appendix A for the 
full list of suggested monetary and non-monetary benefits under the Nagoya 
Protocol.  
 On a more broad level, Article 21 stresses the importance of awareness 
raising projects to be done. These include the establishment of local or indigenous 
committees (21.b), dissemination of information through a national clearing-house 
(21.d), and the education and training of users, providers, and relevant stakeholders 
during the negotiation and implementation process (21.g).  In Madagascar, the 
National Educational Policy Related to the Environment enforces this through close 
collaboration between the Ministry of Education and Scientific Research and the 
Ministry in charge of Environment and Forests (Madagascar – Country Profile). 
 With regards to compliance and enforcement mechanisms of ABS laws and 
benefit-sharing arrangements, the Protocol’s system is highly complex, with 
implications that will be discussed later. The three cornerstones are  
1. Article 15 (compliance with domestic legislation or regulatory 
requirements on ABS); 
2. Article 18 (compliance with MAT); and 




The system is based on “a mix of international and domestic measures, 
including: basic obligations on users to respect national access laws, supportive 
monitoring measures, including through designated ‘checkpoints,’ the issuing of 
internationally recognised certificates of compliance as evidence of legal acquisition 
in provider countries, and the future establishment of an international mechanism 
to address the compliance of Parties with their Protocol obligations in a cooperative 
and non-adversarial manner (Duriasamy, A., 2011). 
Source: Glowka, L., & Normand, V. (2013). The Nagoya Protocol 





Trans-sectorial and International Legal Implications of the Nagoya Protocol 
 
The Nagoya Protocol deals with resources that span across several different 
ecosystems. Furthermore, companies, organisations, and individuals use the 
resources to achieve a wide range of goals. The Nagoya protocol is now on par with 
internationally legally binding documents from various other organisations 
including the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). It is important to note 
how the Nagoya Protocol fits into, and challenges, existing cross-sectorial legal 
frameworks (McGraw, D., 2002). 
 With regards to environmental protection, the Nagoya Protocol has the 
potential to reshape how we approach conservation and protection. The Protocol 
strikes a balance between the economic and non-economic values of biodiversity. As 
Beck et al. notes, articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol “tightly [link] access and benefit 
sharing with the first and second objectives of the CBD – conservation and 
sustainable use.” Even the benefits outlined in the appendix are geared towards 
rewarding those who successfully conserve biodiversity. Several of the concepts 
regarding the crossroads of development and the environment are reflected in the 
UN Sustainable Development Goals, which replaced the Millennium Development 
Goals in 2015.  
 The Nagoya Protocol adds another dimension to how parties approach 
international human rights law. A heavy historical influence of colonialism has 
resulted in the marginalisation of indigenous people. Despite the presence of 
international human rights law aimed towards preventing such marginalisation, the 
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treatment of indigenous people falls under the jurisdiction of regional and national 
law. So, the societal marginalisation many indigenous people face is more often than 
not reflected in discriminatory legal practices (Savaresi, A., 2013). 
 The Nagoya Protocols’ ABS provisions are ground breaking in that it is the 
first time “that such obligations are triggered by the use of traditional knowledge for 
research and development purposes in an international legally binding instrument. 
(Tsioumani, E., 2015)” Traditional knowledge, and by extension the possessors of 
that knowledge, is protected under international law. 
 Furthermore, the Nagoya Protocol aims towards legal empowerment of 
Indigenous and Local Communities (ILCs) through the creation of a compliance 
committee. The committee is consists of 15 regional representatives. “In addition, 
two ILC representatives nominated directly by ILCs, and with at least one from a 
developing country, shall serve as observers and participate in the deliberations of 
the committee, albeit not in decision-making. (Tsioumani, E., 2015)” Despite falling 
short of awarding ILCs full voting rights, their presence in the committee is an 
indispensible legal outlet for them to voice concerns and share opinions regarding 
cases that directly affect them (Savaresi, A., 2013).  
    Further implications for human rights identified by Savaresi include issues of 
information accessibility (which is enhanced with the ABS Clearing-House), and the 
participatory decision making process and justice accessibility of the compliance 
committee (Savaresi, A., 2013). 
 During negotiations, developed countries and the WHO were highly 
concerned about their ability to access pathogens in the case of emergencies or 
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pandemics. They worried that stricter legislation would make their ability to 
respond and create vaccines in a timely manner would be hindered. Developing 
countries worried that emergencies would be used as a pretext for expedited access, 
and they would not receive adequate benefits – particularly affordable vaccine 
access. Negotiations on these issues brought up in Nagoya played a large role in the 
creation of the 2011 WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework for the 
Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and other Benefits (Glowka, L., 
2013).  
 Finally, the CBD and Nagoya Protocol had several implications for the World 
Trade Organisation, World Intellectual Property Organisation, and Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. TRIPS, ratified in 1995, 
set a minimum global standard for the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and patents. It makes no reference to traditional knowledge because 
unlike the CBD, it does not consider customary ownership a form of intellectual 
property because, “without patent protection, ownership does not exist.” 
Furthermore, TRIPS requires each country to set their own patent systems. These 
systems are unenforceable outside their patent domain – a sui generis system (WTO 
Report, 2006). 
  As of now, there are still unresolved issues. For example, a coalition of 
governments charged that pharmaceutical companies must state where they source 
their genetic material in order to receive a patent. This amendment has not been 
made, especially because several members of TRIPS feel that increased regulatory 
measures in TRIPS will result in a decreased autonomy for countries to implement 
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their own standards. As such, it has been difficult to reconcile conflict areas between 
the CBD and TRIPS (WTO Report, 2006). 
Implementation: Process and Challenges 
 
While it is one thing to ratify a treaty and agree upon its principles, it is another 
thing entirely to put those principles into practice. As Tsioumani puts it; 
“Implementation is thus expected to entail a dynamic web 
of legal relationships: administrative decisions on access are 
set out in domestic permits, linking to contractual benefit-
sharing agreements between private parties and backed by the 
establishment of benefit-sharing arrangements to be 
supported by an enabling framework of national laws in 
provider and user countries.” 
 
Interviews with Liva Ramiandrarivo and Naritiana Rakotoniaina, the 
National Focal Points for Madagascar, outlined some of the foreseeable 
implementation challenges. These include financing, capacity building, 
political/governmental blocks, and institutional arrangements.  
 One of the major problems Madagascar faces stems from a lack of – and 
limited access to – funding. The 2009 political crisis resulted in the withdrawal of 
several investors, who worried that the unstable political climate made the risk of 
investment too high. Though Madagascar’s government has stabilised, it has never 
regained its investor base (Ramiandrarivo Interview, 17/11/2015). 
 Now, Madagascar has drafted its National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plan 
(NBSAP), yet without a source of funding, it is difficult to implement. 
Ramiandrarivo’s work with the ministry has seen similar issues. He and his team 
have established 123 new protected areas in Madagascar. While the government is 
willing to provide funding for the Ministry of Forestry, they are incapable due to 
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budgetary constraints to provide funds for the management of those areas.  Now, 
Madagascar is in the process of preparing its proposal to submit at the buyer 
conference in 2016 (Ramiandrarivo Interview, 17/11/2015). 
 The lack of funding has resulted in challenges in capacity building. One 
example is the Ministry of Forestry’s inability to determine the economic value of 
biodiversity in Madagascar. As Ramiandrarivo pointed out, “it is important for us to 
know the economic value of our biodiversity because it enables us to better defend 
our position in negotiations against those who wish to degrade it. (Ramiandrarivo 
Interview, 17/11/2015)” 
 In recent negotiations between the Ministry of Forestry and the mining 
sector, and with petitions going to the government for sub-marine petrol 
exploration, the ministry found it difficult to defend their position and advance their 
cause. Both the mining and petrol sectors had monetary gains they could point to as 
beneficial to the Malagasy economy. But without knowing the economic value of 
biodiversity in Madagascar, conservation and aims to push implementation of the 
CBD remained far too abstract for concrete action (Ramiandrarivo Interview, 
17/11/2015). 
 Naritiana Rakotoniaina faced similar challenges with the Malagasy 
government in trying to implement the Nagoya Protocol. In 2011, SAGE submitted a 
political letter outlining the national approach to implementation, yet due to 
political instability, it was a low priority. Furthermore, it would have taken over two 
years to elaborate the legal framework and create an official ABS law by the time the 
law made it through the bureaucratic steps. So, efforts are now being focused on 
26 
 
transitory measures based on existing research authorisation processes 
(Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15). The Ministry responsible for the environment 
is also working with the GIZ-led multi-donor ABS Capacity Development Initiative to 
further their goals (Robinson, D., 2014). 
 Furthermore, internal discussions regarding the institutional arrangement 
necessary for the implementation of an ABS law have been fraught. Bioprospecting’s 
nature as a cross-sectorial issue requires the coordination of various government 
offices, ranging from the ministry of fisheries, to agriculture, to marine. Madagascar 
has yet to nominate a competent national authority because the question remains 
who or what ministry will host the authority (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15). 
 Should there be the creation of a new bureau designated specifically for 
issues regarding access, benefit sharing, and research rights? Or should it be a 
committee comprised of representatives from affected ministries? Both set ups have 
their pros and cons that need to be examined. The creation of an entirely new 
bureau comes with issues of its potential functionality and fairness dealing with a 
very sensitive topic. Furthermore, the creation of a new bureau would require funds 
the Malagasy government does not have the ability to provide. Yet the creation of a 
committee raises issues of its ability to make timely decisions, as existing ministries 
are hesitant to give up their autonomy in general resource management. Either way, 
the absence of a strong central government makes both options difficult to manage 
(Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15). 
 Finally, since Madagascar already has several bioprospecting ventures under 
way, existing projects must be taken into account. It is not possible to retroactively 
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apply laws, and so the draft legislation must attempt to tackle value chain 
management in order to effectively ensure benefit sharing without retroactive 
application of new legislation (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15). 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS 
Due to the absence of a national framework, trends among corporations seeking 
to utilise domestic resources in Madagascar often depend on contractual 
agreements. One such example of this, and widely considered a success story, is that 
of the International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups (ICBG) Madagascar.  
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups - Madagascar  
 
The ICBG is a consortium of American government research institutions, 
pharmaceutical companies, and international conservation organisations founded in 
1992. It was founded to “integrate improvement of human health through drug 
discovery, creation of incentives for conservation of biodiversity, and promotion of 
scientific research and sustainable economic activity that focuses on environment, 
health, equity, and democracy. (Rosenthal, 1998)” 
The ICBG was conceived as a way to combine the diverse interests of various 
parties under the shared mission of environmental conservation. The belief was that 
the promotion of scientific capacity building and economic incentives would lead to 
a market based conservation mechanism designed to protect the biological 
resources from which commercial products are derived (ICBG).  
Yet despite its commercial motivations, and the fact that the U.S. never 
ratified the CBD or Nagoya protocol, the ICBG’s mission ensures that it closely 
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adopts the access and benefit sharing provisions of both the CBD and Nagoya 
protocol. As Mr Michel Ratsimbason, Director of the Centre National d’Application 
des Recherches Pharmaceutiques, states, “even though the U.S. never ratified the 
CBD, it is clear that they uphold the spirit of the Nagoya protocol.” (Ratsimbason 
Interview, 11/11/15)  
Dr David Kingston, of Virginia Polytechnic Institute, heads ICBG’s Madagascar 
chapter. The chapter was founded in 1998 and went through three successive five-
year funding cycles, from 1998 – 2003, 2003 – 2008, and 2008 – 2013. Funding 
comes from the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH), National Science Foundation, 
and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDOA) (Rosenthal, J. 1998). These three 
institutions are partnered with the following members of the Madagascar 
consortium: 
 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, 
Virginia – The university that Dr David Kingston is based, and the site 
most research on extracts and ex situ conservation are done at; 
 Centre National d’Application des Recherches Pharmaceutiques 
(CNARP) – CNARP is a public Malagasy research institution partially 
funded by the state. Their goal is to reinforce and valorise the 
traditional medicine system of Madagascar, and does both research 
and synthesis of pharmaceutical products (Ratsimbason Interview, 
11/11/2015); 
 Centre National de Recherches sur l’Environnement (CNRE); 
 Centre National des Recherches Océanographiques (CNRO); 
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 Missouri Botanical Gardens (MBG) – MBG is an American Botanical 
society with a presence in Madagascar. Their objectives are mostly 
botanical research, species identification, and the establishment of a 
national plant database, though they have recently gotten more 
involved with community based conservation efforts (Birkinshaw 
Interview, 23/11/2015); 
 Conservation International (CI); 
 Eisai Pharmaceutical Research Institution; and 
 Dow Agrosciences (DAS). 
Managing to get such diverse organisations to agree and cooperate was no 
easy feat, and was accomplished through an “all-party Research Agreement.” Since 
the funding agencies (NIH, USDOA, and NSF) are not parties to the research, “they 
are prohibited by U.S. Federal law from stipulating specific contractual terms.” 
(Rosenthal) Rather, they encourage parties to develop agreements that abide by the 
general framework of principles: 
1. Active participation of host country individuals and 
organisations from the planning stage onward,  
2. Multi-disciplinary research on diseases of both local 
and international significance,  
3. Local training and infrastructure development in 
both drug discovery and biodiversity management,  
4. Biodiversity inventory and monitoring, and  
5. Equitable intellectual property and benefit-sharing 
arrangements. (Rosenthal) 
 
The contract, written by a lawyer from Conservation International 
(Robinson, 51, 2014), is confidential, as most private sector commercial agreements 
are. The ICBG rejected Madagascar’s offer of support in drafting the contract, opting 
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instead to use CI’s lawyer (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15). This is important to 
note, as it makes the transparency that could potentially be achieved through 
governmental contracts and the ABS clearing-house mechanism non-existent. The 
implications of this lack of transparency could result in abuse of contracts, and 
limited compliance enforcing capabilities.  
According to Rakotoniaina, the contract was signed in the U.S., and 
Madagascar’s government was simply notified it was signed, and they never 
received a copy of the document (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15). 
 Furthermore, the confidential nature of the document makes it difficult for 
the general public – including directly and indirectly affected indigenous and local 
community members – to know what lies within their rights, and what parties to the 
agreement are obligated to do. This makes it difficult to protect against potential 
human rights abuses. 
 Nevertheless, discussions with members of the ICBG provide insights as to 
agreements within the Research Agreement. Agreements cover a range of topics, 
such as access regarding use and type of genetic resources, intellectual property 
rights and confidentiality, use of traditional knowledge, prior informed consent, and 
compensation and royalties.  
Access and Use 
 
 The types of genetic resources accessible include plants (whose use and 
documentation is monitored by Michel Ratsimbason at CNARP and MBG), marine 
life (monitored by CNRO), and microbial extracts (monitored by Rado 
Rasolomampianina at CNER). Extracts include both biochemical compounds and 
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DNA. Resources are to be used for scientific and potential commercial purposes. 
Finally, sectorial use is limited to the agriculture industry for pesticides, herbicides, 
and crop protections through DAS, and pharmaceutical use through Eisai and 
previously, Bristol-Myers Squibb (Robinson, D., 2014). 
 As MBG botanist Chris Birkinshaw emphasised, no live organic matter was 
removed from Madagascar despite requests and petitions to the Malagasy 
government (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/12015). 
 No ethnobotanical knowledge was used during the surveying and collection 
of plants. Whilst in the field with local guides, even if local knowledge regarding 
plant uses was volunteered, MBG researchers were instructed to not record it. All 
field journals were made public, verifying that no record was taken of traditional 
knowledge received (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/12015). 
 Prior informed consent (PIC) was “given at the national level by the 
Government through the Ministry in charge of Scientific research (who signed the 
contract), at the regional level by the “Chef de région,” and at the local level by local 
authorities (mainly mayors) and by the local communities (pers. corr. Christian 
Camara, 27/11/2015).”  With the local communities, representatives of the ICBG 
project would explain the project and implications to the committee of villagers. 
They would explain the benefit sharing that would result from consent, and the 
community members would make a decision (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015). 
Though “there was no real legal obligation in Madagascar for the project to 
[obtain PIC], the consortium agreed from the start that ICBG would comply with 
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international standards. The CBD was used as reference (pers. corr. Camara, 
27/11/2015).”  
 Yet as Chris Birkinshaw noted, throughout the process it was unclear 
whether or not villagers entirely understood the implications of the ICBG program, 
or whether they simply agreed in order to receive the benefits. As he put it, “telling a 
group of villagers that they would receive thousands of dollars to build schools, 
bridges, and wells in exchange for a tea spoon of soil from their forest seems 
preposterous.” (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015) 
 This dilemma outlines the importance of Article 21 of the Nagoya Protocol. 
Article 21 seeks to raise awareness about ABS and the Nagoya Protocol, with the 
hope that with this knowledge communities will be better informed to make 
educated decisions regarding their resources. 
 Though authorities and community members granted consent, it was granted 
in the absence of participation from a competent national authority accountable to 
the Nagoya Protocol standards. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether the 
consent granted complied with protocol that determines what constitutes prior 
informed consent, even if it fully complies with the terms outlined in the all party 
Research Agreement.  
Although “PIC was given every time the project intervention site was 
changed, (pers. corr. Camara, 27/11/2015)” changing environmental, economic, and 
social landscapes have the potential to make the context consent was given 
irrelevant – yet another slippery slope. 
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 Subsequent to obtaining PIC, access was granted and use was limited to 
members of the ICBG consortium. Restrictions were placed on third party transfers 
in order to maximise potential benefit to consortium members Dow and Eisai. What 
remains unclear, however, is “if third party transfers might occurs at a later date in 
the future, and what terms the contract has relating to this. (Robinson, D. 49, 2014)” 
 For Naritiana Rakotoniaina, the ambiguity surrounding third party use 
provides a problem for the Malagasy governments’ enforcement of the Nagoya 
Protocol. Now that the project has concluded, there is no way for the Malagasy 
government to monitor samples that have been sent out of the country for ex-situ 
conservation or research (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/2015). 
 The ICBG counters that working through CNARP checks this threat. CNARP 
would collect, identify, and dry out the plants, and send them to U.S. research 
institutions with a code system. The code system prevented the U.S. researchers 
from knowing exactly what species the plant was and where it was obtained. 
Without this information, access to biomass becomes much more difficult 
(Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015). 
Benefit Sharing 
 
Perhaps the most obvious and immediate benefit received from the ICBG 
came from the Compensation Fund. The fund was paid for by Eisai and Dow, and 
was a way to provide compensation for the collection and use of genetic resources 
regardless of what came out of the research. This is especially important, since the 
development process often takes 5 – 15 years (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015). 
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 50% of the fund went directly to local communities, and manifested itself in 
development and conservation projects. Schools, bridges, wells, and the like were 
built. Conservation projects included community forests and agricultural ventures. 
In the first phase of the project, Zahamena was the only community working with 
the ICBG and had access to all 50% of the compensation fund. Yet as the project 
grew and worked with more communities, the fund was divided among 
communities they worked with (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015). 
The other 50% of the compensation fund was directed to the national 
government and Malagasy research institutions working with ICBG (CNARP, CNRE, 
and CNRO). For Mr Ratsimbason and his team at CNARP, the compensation fund was 
an invaluable tool in setting up CNARP’s malaria lab. Malaria runs rampant among 
the Malagasy population, and CNARP has managed to dedicate significant amounts 
of time and energy to researching malaria. This would not have been possible 
without the assistance of equipment purchased through the compensation fund. Mr 
Ratsimbason believes that without the ICBG, combatting malaria would not be at the 
level it is today in Madagascar. Furthermore, the ICBG paid for several of CNARP’s 
researchers to be sent for training at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, with all expenses 
paid (Ratsimbason Interview, 11/11/2015).  
Another example of the benefits the compensation fund has provided 
Madagascar is with CNRE. CNRE was able to obtain very expensive soil analysis 
equipment through the compensation fund, and possession of that equipment has 




Yet officials in the Malagasy government are unhappy with the compensation 
fund, believing it to be insufficient in comparison to the potential profits and scale of 
use of resources. Had a national framework been in place, negotiations to set a 
number the Malagasy government agreed with would have been much more 
productive (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/2015). 
Apart from the initial compensation fund, the ICBG set up milestone 
payments (to be paid at key development intervals), and royalties (percentage 
shares of profits received once a drug is developed and reaches the market) 
(Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015). 
As of now, no drugs have been developed, so milestone and royalty payments 
are inactive. This is verified by MBG, who says that they would know if a plant 
contained compounds of interest because the orders of biomass would go 
significantly up to supply the increase in research activity, and MBG and CNARP 
would notice (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015).  
Another check to ensure Madagascar is not being cheated is also a part of the 
non-monetary benefits scheme – information sharing.  Each year, Dr David Kingston 
is required to publish the findings and research of the ICBG’s efforts. This serves two 
purposes; firstly, publication renders the information public and thus not 
patentable, since the information is no longer new or novel. This in turn protects 
Madagascar against biopiracy cases, and is further protected with the coding system 
discussed previously (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015). 
Secondly, the information sharing system provides Madagascar the option to 
pursue research of interest in Madagascar even though it may not be in the U.S. 
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Access to and permission to use that information saves considerable time and effort 
on Madagascar’s end (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015). 
While not without its flaws, the general consensus has been that ICBG 
Madagascar has been one of the more successful ICBG projects in the world. It is 
important to take into account the potential success of non-governmental 
contractual agreements when developing a national framework for implementation 
of the Nagoya protocol, in order to ensure flexibility among partnerships, and that 
international standards are upheld.  
CONCLUSION 
 As Madagascar continues its laudable work at developing ABS frameworks, 
there remain several factors to be taken into account. The first factor is the several 
legal grey areas that exist. For example, are genetic resources found on private 
property government property? Who is responsible for the ultimate authorisation – 
landowner or government? 
 Secondly, Madagascar must continue to look forward in light of the recent 
Sustainable Development Goals and the 2020 Aichi Biodiversity Targets and attempt 
to work ABS provisions in with the broader goal of environmental conservation.   
 Work must continue to tackle the hurdles blocking a successful 
implementation of Nagoya. Suggested research should include continued surveys of 
implementation stages, research on the feasibility of various institutional 
arrangements, methods for capacity building, and enhancing cross-sectorial 
communication and coordination. The Nagoya Protocol has the potential to be 
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incredibly beneficial for all parties involved. Yet for it to work, Madagascar must do 
all it can to promote its effective implementation in the coming years. 
 
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A: Suggested Elements for Material Transfer Agreements 
 
Material transfer agreements may contain wording on the following elements: 
A. Introductory provisions 
1. Preambular reference to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
2. Legal status of the provider and user of genetic resources 
3. Mandate and/or general objectives of provider and, where appropriate, user of 
genetic resources 
B. Access and benefit-sharing provisions 
1. Description of genetic resources covered by the material transfer agreements, 
including accompanying information 
2. Permitted uses, bearing in mind the potential uses, of the genetic resources, 
their products or derivatives under the material transfer agreement (e.g. 
research, breeding, commercialization) 
3. Statement that any change of use would require new prior informed consent 
and material transfer agreement 
4. Whether intellectual property rights may be sought and if so under what 
conditions 
5. Terms of benefit-sharing arrangements, including commitment to share 
monetary and non-monetary benefits 
6. No warranties guaranteed by provider on identity and/or quality of the 
provided material 
7. Whether the genetic resources and/or accompanying information may be 
transferred to third parties and if so conditions that should apply 
8. Definitions 
9. Duty to minimize environmental impacts of collecting activities 
C. Legal provisions 
1. Obligation to comply with the material transfer agreement 
2. Duration of agreement 
3. Notice to terminate the agreement 
4. Fact that the obligations in certain clauses survive the termination of the 
agreement 
5. Independent enforceability of individual clauses in the agreement 
6. Events limiting the liability of either party (such as act of God, fire, flood, etc.) 
7. Dispute settlement arrangements 
8. Assignment or transfer of rights 
9. Assignment, transfer or exclusion of the right to claim any property rights, 
including intellectual property rights, over the genetic resources received 
through the material transfer agreement 
10. Choice of law 





APPENDIX B: Monetary and Non-Monetary Benefits 
1. Monetary benefits may include, but not be limited to: 
a. Access fees/fee per sample collected or otherwise acquired; 
b. Up-front payments; 
c. Milestone payments; 
d. Payment of royalties; 
e.  License fees in case of commercialization; 
f. Special fees to be paid to trust funds supporting conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity; 
g.  Salaries and preferential terms where mutually agreed; 
h.  Research funding; 
i.  Joint ventures; 
j. Joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights.  
2. Non-monetary benefits may include, but not be limited to: 
a. Sharing of research and development results; 
b. Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in scientific research and 
development programmes, particularly biotechnological research activities, 
where possible in the provider country; 
c. Participation in product development; 
d. Cooperation and contribution in education and training; 
e. Admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources and to databases;  
f. Transfer to the provider of the genetic resources of knowledge and technology 
under fair and most favourable terms, including on concessional and 
preferential terms where agreed, in particular, knowledge and technology that 
make use of genetic resources, including biotechnology, or that are relevant to 
the conservation and sustainable utilization of biological diversity; 
g. Strengthening capacities for technology transfer to user developing country 
Parties and to Parties that are countries with economies in transition and 
technology development in the country of origin that provides genetic 
resources. Also to facilitate abilities of indigenous and local communities to 
conserve and sustainably use their genetic resources; 
h. Institutional capacity-building; 
i. Human and material resources to strengthen the capacities for the 
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ISP REVIEW SHEET 
 
1. Your topic - suitability, development, accessibility 
 
My topic was very interesting, and accessible. However with the limited time period it 
was hard to set up as many interviews as I’d have liked. It involved a lot of waiting for 
people to reply to me. Taxiing around the city was efficient but expensive. 
 
2. Location of field study - where you conducted your field study, who helped set it 
up (who was helpful and who was not; include names, addresses, and phone 
numbers if possible), strengths and weaknesses of the site 
 
I conducted my study in Antananarivo, mostly in the offices of people I was 
interviewing. Joel, the pharmacology student assisting me was very useful in helping 
me get around. My advisor, Voahangy, provided a wonderful starting point for people I 
could interview. 
 
3. Nuts and bolts - where to get water & food, costs, where to stay, medical 
resources, other problems 
 
I stayed with Patricia’s parents in Ivandry. Very useful, they provided me with delicious 
food and beverages. 
 




List your secondary sources and contacts, where they were found, and which were 
most helpful here:- 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
